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It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice be-
havior in a way that is robust to indiﬀerent selection (i.e., the agent is indiﬀer-
ent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one
of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indiﬀerent
selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is for-
malized and generalized to a purely topological framework: preferences over
an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behav-
ior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that
a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indiﬀerent selection is
then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases
are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and
preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.
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Introduction
How does an agent choose between two indiﬀerent alternatives a and a′? On the
one hand, indiﬀerence means that she views this choice as (ex ante) immaterial for
her well-being, so she might as well select a, or a′, or randomize between them,
or delegate her choice. On the other hand, for an outside observer who only has
data about the agent’s choice behavior, say the agent chooses a over a′, it is of
importance to know whether the agent actually strictly prefers a to a′ or she is
indiﬀerent between a and a′. In the latter case, we say that the agent makes an
indiﬀerent selection.
To illustrate the importance of indiﬀerent selection, consider a social planner
who has to select between two social alternatives a and a′. The alternatives involve
two agents and the social planner has data about their respective choice behavior,
from which he seeks to infer their respective preferences. The ﬁrst agent strictly
prefers a to a′ and, accordingly, chooses a over a′; the second agent is indiﬀerent
between a and a′ but nevertheless selects a′ over a. Then a Pareto-dominates a′, but
if the social planner assumes that his observations about the agent’s behavior fully
reﬂect their preferences, he will think that the second agent strictly prefers a′ to a
and, hence, that a and a′ are Pareto-noncomparable. Thus, neglecting indiﬀerent
selection can block Pareto-improvements (e.g., if g is the status quo).
How, then, can one disentangle between strict preference and indiﬀerence based
on behavioral data? The usual revealed preference approach merely rules out in-
diﬀerent selection by assuming that if the agent is indiﬀerent between a and a′,
then she will be observed randomizing between a and a′. However, this assumption
is, however, hard to justify: why could not an indiﬀerent agent decide to select a,
say, instead of resorting to a randomization device, or to randomize subjectively
rather that observably? In his pioneering work on decision making under uncer-
tainty, Savage (1954, p17) noted the problem of indiﬀerent selection and informally
suggested a more satisfactory solution: he argued that indiﬀerence could be revealed
by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives. Namely, if the agent is
indiﬀerent between a and a′, then adjoining any (however small) monetary bonus to
a should make it chosen over a′ and, similarly, adjoining any bonus to a′ should make
it chosen over a. On the other hand, if she strictly prefers a to a′, then adjoining a
small enough bonus to a′ should not make it chosen over a.E. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 2
This paper formalizes Savage (1954)’s argument in a general topological frame-
work. More precisely, it is shown that if preferences over an arbitrary topological
space are assumed to be continuous and nonsatiated, and that a strictly preferred
alternative is always chosen, then preferences can be uniquely derived from observed
behavior, and indiﬀerent selection is characterized by discontinuity in behavior. To
make the model fully behavioral, necessary and suﬃcient conditions on behavior are
then provided under which there indeed exists a preference relation satisfying these
assumptions.
Two applications of this general model are provided. First, if the set of al-
ternatives is naturally endowed with a partial order representing some notion of
objective betterness (Cubitt and Sugden, 2001), e.g., more money is better, then
the nonsatiation condition is naturally strengthened to monotonicity with respect
to this partial order. In this particular setup, Savage (1954)’s informal argument
is explicitly recovered. Second (and going back to the general topological setup),
in the case where the derived preferences can be represented by a continuous util-
ity function, this function turns out to be a pseudo-utility representation (Moulin,
1988; Subiza and Peris, 1998) of observed behavior. Thus, choice behavior can yield
a continuous pseudo-utility function even though it might not be continuous nor
even representable by any utility function in the usual sense. This gives rise to
generalizations of classical representation results for continuous preferences over a
topological space (Eilenberg, 1941; Debreu, 1954; Rader, 1963).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the setup. Section 2
presents an example illustrating all subsequent results. Section 3 contains the general
results for preferences over an arbitrary topological space. Section 4 analyzes the
particular case of monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set. Section 5
analyzes the particular case of preferences representable by a pseudo-utility function.
1 Setup
Let R and Q denote the set of real and rational numbers, respectively. Consider an
agent facing an arbitrary set A of choice alternatives. The agent’s preferences over
A are modeled by means of a binary relation < on A (i.e., < ⊆ A × A ), with
a < a′ indicating that she weakly prefers a to a′. As usual, we say that < is:E. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 3
– reﬂexive if, for all a ∈ A ,a < a,
– complete if, for all a,a′ ∈ A , [a < a′ or a′ < a],
– antisymmetric if, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,[a < a′ and a′ < a] ⇒ a = a′,
– transitive if, for all a,a′,a′′ ∈ A ,[a < a′ and a′ < a′′] ⇒ a < a′′.
From < are derived the binary relations ≻ and ∼ on A deﬁned by, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,
a ≻ a
′ ⇔ [a < a
′ and not a
′ < a] (strict preference),
a ∼ a
′ ⇔ [a < a
′ and a
′ < a] (indiﬀerence).
We distinguish between preferences modeling the agent’s choice behavior and
preferences modeling her tastes. Formally, the agent is endowed with two distinct
preference relations on A :
– a behavioral preference relation, denoted by <B, with a <B a′ indicating that she
would select a if she had to choose between a and a′,
– a cognitive preference relation, denoted by <C, with a <C a′ indicating that she
likes a at least as much as a′.
We assume that the agent’s choice behavior does not contradict her tastes in the
sense of choosing a strictly less liked alternative:
Deﬁnition. A binary relation <B on a set A is compatible with a binary relation
<C on A if, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,a ≻C a′ ⇒ a ≻B a′.
Although situations in which a ≻C a′ and a′ ≻B a can be conceived (e.g., addic-
tion), compatibility of behavior with tastes seems natural in most economic settings.
Note that no constraint is imposed on choice behavior in situations of cognitive indif-
ference, which allows for indiﬀerent selection, i.e., a ∼C a′ and [a ≻B a′ or a′ ≻B a].
This is unlike many economic models that implicitly assume <B = <C (Mandler,
2005) and, hence, ∼B = ∼C, thereby ruling out indiﬀerent selection (e.g., when de-
termining equilibrium and analyzing welfare by means of a single preference relation
per agent). Whereas the conceptual distinction between these two preference con-
cepts is well-understood in the literature (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995,
p5), behavioral preferences falling in the revealed preference tradition (Samuelson,
1938) and cognitive preferences in the ordinalist tradition (Pareto, 1906), their for-
mal distinction is a key feature of the present analysis.E. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 4
Note that assuming <B = <C ﬁrst requires that one allows for behavioral indif-
ference between distinct alternatives (otherwise cognitive indiﬀerence is ruled out).
Thus, the revealed preference literature often ﬁnds it convenient to interpret behav-
ioral preference as indicating that an alternative is “choosable” rather than actually
chosen, and to operationalize this interpretation by enabling the agent to resort
to some observable randomization (or delegation) device rather than selecting one
single alternative by herself. However, even if randomization is allowed and iden-
tiﬁed with behavioral indiﬀerence, it is hard to justify why the agent could not
decide to select a single alternative by herself rather than randomize when she is
cognitively indiﬀerent (in fact, cognitive indiﬀerence precisely means that she views
such a selection as harmless), or to randomize subjectively rather than observably.
The starting point of the present analysis is the formal separation between the two
preference concepts and the degree of freedom between them that is allowed by the
compatibility assumption. Although it becomes possible, in this framework, to rule
out a ∼B a′ per se, in line with a fully behavioral interpretation of preference, this
turns out to be technically unnecessary and, consequently, <B is not assumed to be
antisymmetric.
Both <B and <C are assumed to be complete. Completeness of behavioral
preferences means that choice between any two alternatives in A is conceivable
and is generally considered an innocuous assumption. Completeness of cognitive
preferences, although also a standard assumption, is often judged restrictive: it
means that the agent is able to come up with a judgment about which of any two
alternatives in A she likes better. The role of this assumption here is to single out
indiﬀerent selection as the only possible source of discrepancy between behavioral
and cognitive preferences:
Lemma 1. Let <B and <C be two complete binary relations on a set A such that
<B is compatible with <C. Then <C = <B ∪ ∼C.
Proof. By compatibility, one has ≻C ⊆ <B and, hence, <C = ≻C ∪ ∼C ⊆ <B ∪ ∼C.
Conversely, completeness of <C and compatibility together imply <B ⊆ <C and,
hence, <B ∪ ∼C ⊆ <C ∪ ∼C = <C.
As appears from Lemma 1, under our completeness and compatibility assump-
tions, cognitive and behavioral preferences only diﬀer for alternatives a and a′ suchE. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 5
that a ∼C a′ and [a ≻B a′ or a′ ≻B a] (for a similar analysis allowing for incomplete
preferences, see Danan, 2003). Finally, it should be noted that neither cognitive nor
behavioral preferences are assumed to be transitive.
The present analysis assumes that <B is observable but not <C, and addresses
the question whether <C can be recovered from <B. This is in line with a revealed
preference approach: the agent’s tastes, which are unobservable mental states, are
revealed by her observable choice behavior (if choice behavior is modeled, more
generally, by a choice function, then the existence of a complete behavioral preference
relation is characterized by Sen (1971)’s Axioms α and γ). In the present setup, the
problem boils down to that of behaviorally identifying indiﬀerent selection.
2 An example
As an illustration, suppose alternatives are commodity bundles made of two goods,
and the agent is observed choosing lexicographically by, ﬁrst, maximizing the total
quantity of goods and, second, maximizing the quantity of good 1. Formally, A =















2 and x1 ≥ x
′
1]].
Note that <B is antisymmetric and, therefore, can receive a fully behavioral in-
terpretation. What can we say about the agent’s cognitive preferences? First, it
is possible that her tastes fully coincide with her observed behavior and that she
never makes an indiﬀerent selection, i.e., <C = <B. But it might also be the case
that her tastes do not select between any alternatives and that her behavioral pref-
erences fully result from indiﬀerent selection, i.e., <C = A × A . Between these
two extremes, it is conceivable, e.g., that only the total quantity of goods matters
according to her tastes whereas maximizing the quantity of good 1 is only used to












Thus, additional assumptions must be imposed in order to pin down the agent’s
cognitive preferences.E. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 6
Now, note that, among the three possible cognitive preference relations deﬁned
above, the ﬁrst is discontinuous and the second is locally satiated (i.e., it has a
local maximum). As it turns out, the latter is the unique continuous and locally
nonsatiated cognitive preference relation with which <B is compatible. Furthermore,
the diﬀerence between <B (which is locally nonsatiated and discontinuous) and this
third cognitive preference relation resides in the continuity of the latter: indiﬀerent
selection is characterized by discontinuity of the behavioral preference relation. As
shown in Section 3, this argument can be generalized to preferences over an arbitrary
topological space A .
In this example, nonsatiation of <C (the third one) takes a particular form: not
only is any bundle strictly dispreferred to some other bundle in each of its neigh-
borhoods, but there are some speciﬁc directions along which these other bundles
are found. Namely, (x′
1,x′
2) ≻C (x1,x2) whenever (x′
1,x′
2) > (x1,x2), i.e., <C is
monotonic with respect to the vector order ≥ on R2. If we assume that one of
the goods is money, then we explicitly recover Savage (1954)’s informal argument
that indiﬀerent selection can be revealed by adjoining small monetary bonuses to
alternatives: it is characterized by a strict behavioral preference that is reversed by
adjoining an arbitrarily small bonus by the unchosen alternative. Section 4 general-
izes this argument to preferences over any partially ordered set A satisfying some
unboundedness and denseness properties.
Finally, note that <C can be represented by the continuous utility function
u : A → R deﬁned by, for all (x1,x2) ∈ R2,u(x1,x2) = x1 + x2, and that u is
unique up to a strictly increasing and continuous transformation. This function,
then, also represent <B, but in a weaker sense (namely, (x1,x2) ≻B (x′
1,x′
2) when-
ever u(x1,x2) > (x′
1,x′
2), but information on indiﬀerent selection is lost). Note that
this continuous utility function can be derived even though <B is neither continuous
nor even representable by any utility function in the usual sense. Section 5 proceeds
in this fashion to generalize classical representation results for continuous prefer-
ences over a topological space A satisfying some countability and connectedness
properties.E. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 7
3 Main results
Now turning to the general case, we assume A is a topological space (Munkres, 2000)
and denote by cl(.) and int(.) the closure and interior operators on A , respectively.
Given an alternative a ∈ A and a binary relation B on A (B = <,≻,∼), we deﬁne
the following subsets of A :
A(B,a) = {a
′ ∈ A : a
′ B a},
A(a,B) = {a
′ ∈ A : a B a
′}.
We say that a binary relation < on A is:
– upper semi-continuous if, for all a ∈ A , A(<,a) is closed,
– weakly upper nonsatiated if, for all a ∈ A ,a ∈ cl(A(≻,a)),
– strongly upper nonsatiated if, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,a < a′ ⇒ a ∈ cl(A(≻,a′)).
Upper semi-continuity is deﬁned as usual (if < is complete, then it is equivalent to
require that A(a,≻) be open). Weak upper nonsatiation also corresponds to the
standard notion of local nonsatiation of preferences: no alternative in A is a local
maximum for <. If < is transitive, then this local property has the following global
implication: if a < a′, then any neighborhood of a contains an alternative a′′ such
that a′′ ≻ a and, hence, a′′ ≻ a′, so a ∈ cl(A(≻,a′)). This latter property is inde-
pendently stated as strong upper nonsatiation because transitivity is not assumed
here (it indeed implies weak upper nonsatiation provided that < is reﬂexive). Note
that if < is strongly upper nonsatiated, then it has “thin indiﬀerence curves” in the
sense that, for all a ∈ A , A(∼,a) is nowhere dense.
Upper semi-continuity and strong upper nonsatiation turn out to be suﬃcient
for pinning down the agent’s cognitive preference relation:
Theorem 1. Let <B and <C be two complete binary relations on a topological
space A such that <B is compatible with <C. If <C is upper semi-continuous and
strongly upper nonsatiated, then, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,
a <C a
′ ⇔ a ∈ cl(A(<B,a
′)). (1)
Proof. Let a,a′ ∈ A . If a <C a′, then a ∈ cl(A(≻C,a′)) because <C is strongly
upper nonsatiated and, hence, a ∈ cl(A(≻B,a′)) because <B is compatible withE. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 8
<C, so a ∈ cl(A(<B,a′)). Conversely, if a ∈ cl(A(<B,a′)), then a ∈ cl(A(<C,a′))
because <C is complete and <B is compatible with <C and, hence, a ∈ A(<C,a′)
because <C is upper semi-continuous, i.e., a <C a′.
To understand how indiﬀerent selection is behaviorally identiﬁed, consider two
alternatives a and a′ such that a ≻B a′ and say that (a,a′) is an upper semi-
discontinuity point for <B if a′ ∈ cl(A(<B,a)). It then follows from Equation 1 that
the agent makes an indiﬀerent selection between a and a′ (i.e., a ∼C a′) if and only
if (a,a′) is an upper semi-discontinuity point for <B. More precisely, if (a,a′) is an
upper semi-discontinuity point for <B, then one must have a ∼C a′ by upper semi-
continuity of <C (this rules out, e.g., <C = <B in Section 2’s example). Conversely,
if (a,a′) is not an upper semi-discontinuity point for <B, then one cannot have
a ∼C a′ by strong upper nonsatiation of <C (this rules out, e.g., <C = A × A in
Section 2’s example).
Now, in order to obtain a fully behavioral result, we need to characterize those
behavioral preference relations <B for which the cognitive preference relation <C
deﬁned by Equation 1 is indeed upper semi-continuous and strongly upper nonsa-
tiated. Because <C only diﬀers from <B by the fact that it has more indiﬀerences
(see Lemma 1), satiation of <B would imply satiation of <C, so it is necessary
that <B be strongly upper nonsatiated. On the other hand, upper semi-continuity
of <B is not necessary, as shown by Section 2’s example. However, strong upper
nonsatiation of <B alone is not suﬃcient. For example, let A = R, deﬁne the
function f : R → R by, for all x ∈ R, f(x) = x if x ∈ Q and f(x) = −x other-
wise, and assume the agent’s behavioral preference relation <B is given by, for all
x,x′ ∈ R,x <B x′ ⇔ f(x) ≥ f(x′). Then <B is strongly upper nonsatiated but
Equation 1 implies x ∼C 0 for all x ∈ R, so <C is not strongly upper nonsatiated.
The problem is that <B is too discontinuous. More precisely, (x,0) is an upper
semidiscontinuity point for all x ∈ Q and Q is dense in R. On the contrary, for any
alternative a′ ∈ A , we need (a,a′) to be an upper semi-discontinuity point for only
a nowhere dense set of alternatives a for A(∼C,a′) to be nowhere dense.
To capture this latter property, say that a binary relation < on a topological
space A is upper archimedean if, for all a,a′ ∈ A such that a ≻ a′ and for all
neighborhood V of a, there exist ˆ a ∈ V and a neighborhood V ′ of a′ such that, for
all ˆ a′ ∈ V ′,ˆ a ≻ ˆ a′. Intuitively, small variations in alternatives have a small eﬀect onE. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 9
preferences: if a ≻ a′ and one moves from a to some close (and strictly preferred, by
nonsatiation) ˆ a, then ˆ a ≻ ˆ a′ for all ˆ a′ suﬃciently close to a′. It follows that (ˆ a,a′)
cannot be an upper semi-discontinuity point for any ˆ a suﬃciently close to a, ruling
out the preceding example. Any upper semi-continuous binary relation is upper
archinedean, but the converse does not hold, as shown by Section 2’s example. We
can now state:
Theorem 2. Let <B be a complete binary relation on a topological space A . Then
<B is upper archimedean and strongly upper nonsatiated if and only if there exists
a complete, upper semi-continuous and strongly upper nonsatiated binary relation
<C on A such that <B is compatible with <C. Moreover, <C is unique.
Proof. Uniqueness follows from Theorem 1. Assume that <B is upper archimedean
and strongly upper nonsatiated. The binary relation <C on A deﬁned by Equation 1
is complete by completeness of <B and upper semi-continuous by deﬁnition. More-
over, for all a,a′ ∈ A , a <B a′ ⇒ a <C a′ and, hence, <B is compatible with <C.
Now, let a,a′ ∈ A such that a <C a′, and let V be a neighborhood of a. Then there
exists ¯ a ∈ V such that ¯ a <B a′. Hence, by strong upper nonsatiation of <B, there
exists ˜ a ∈ V such that ˜ a ≻B a′. Hence, by upper archimedeanness of <B, there exist
ˆ a ∈ V and a neighborhood V ′ of a′ such that ˆ a ≻B ˆ a′ for all ˆ a′ ∈ V ′. It follows that
ˆ a ≻C a′ by Equation 1, so <C is strongly upper nonsatiated.
Conversely, assume that there exists a complete, upper semi-continuous and
strongly upper nonsatiated binary relation <C on A such that <B is compatible
with <C. Let a,a′ ∈ A such that a <B a′. Then a <C a′ by completeness of <C
and compatibility and, hence, a ∈ cl(A(≻C,a′)) by strong upper nonsatiation of
<C. Hence a ∈ cl(A(≻B,a′)) by compatibility, so <B is strongly upper nonsatiated.
Now, let a,a′ ∈ A such that a ≻B a′, and let V be a neighborhood of a. By the
preceding argument, there exists ˆ a ∈ V such ˆ a ≻C a′. Hence, by completeness of
<B, there exists a neighborhood V ′ of a′ such that ˆ a ≻B ˆ a′ for all ˆ a′ ∈ V ′, so <B is
upper archimedean.
Finally, let us note that Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 also hold if upper semi-
continuity, strong upper nonsatiation, and upper archimedeanness are replaced by
their lower analogs. More precisely, say that a binary relation < on a topological
space A is:E. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 10
– lower semi-continuous if, for all a ∈ A , A(a,<) is closed,
– weakly lower nonsatiated if, for all a ∈ A ,a ∈ cl(A(a,≻)),
– strongly lower nonsatiated if, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,a < a′ ⇒ a′ ∈ cl(A(a,≻)),
– lower archimedean if, for all a,a′ ∈ A such a ≻ a′ and for all neighborhood V ′ of
a′, there exist ˆ a′ ∈ V ′ and a neighborhood V of a such that, for all ˆ a ∈ V , ˆ a ≻ ˆ a′.




Moreover, the upper and lower versions of the results can straightforwardly be com-
bined: say that a binary relation < on a topological space A is continuous if it is
both upper semi-continuous and lower semi-continuous, weakly (resp., strongly) non-
satiated if it is both weakly (resp., strongly) upper nonsatiated and weakly (resp.,
strongly) lower nonsatiated, and archimedean if it is both upper archimedean and
lower archimedean.
4 Monotonic preferences
In his pioneering work on decision making under uncertainty, Savage (1954) men-
tioned the problem of indiﬀerent selection, and informally suggested to solve it by
adjoining small monetary bonuses to alternatives. As he argued, cognitive weak
preference for a over a′ could then be behaviorally identiﬁed with the observation
that any (however small) bonus adjoined to a makes it chosen over a′. This ar-
gument can be formally recovered as a special case of Section 3’s analysis. More
precisely, the essential point about money here is that any strictly positive monetary
bonus can be considered as an objective improvement, i.e., it can be assumed that
the agents always prefers more money.
In order to capture this notion of objective betterness (Cubitt and Sugden, 2001),
we assume that A is a partially ordered set (poset), and denote by ≥∗ its partial
order relation (i.e., ≥∗ is a reﬂexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation
on A ). If a >∗ a′, we say that a dominates a′, i.e., a is objectively strictly better
than a′. We also assume that the poset A is unbounded (i.e., for all a ∈ A , there
exist a′,a′′ ∈ A such that a′ >∗ a >∗ a′′) and dense (i.e., for all a,a′ ∈ A such that
a >∗ a′, there exists a′′ ∈ A such that a >∗ a′′ >∗ a′).E. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 11
The monetary incentives setup corresponds to the following special case: assume
A = B × R, where B is an arbitrary set of basic alternatives (on which one wants
to elicit the agent’s preferences), and R stands for the set of monetary payoﬀs. Thus
the alternative (b,ε) ∈ A corresponds to the basic alternative b with an adjoined
monetary bonus ε (note that R can be reduced to any open interval). Deﬁne the




′) ⇔ [b = b
′ and ε ≥ ε
′].
Then ≥∗ is unbounded (meaning that a positive or negative monetary bonus can be
adjoined to any alternative in A ) and dense (reﬂecting perfect divisibility of money).
Note that, more generally, R could be replaced by any set naturally endowed with an
unbounded and dense order (i.e., complete partial order), e.g., representing quality
of some good (higher quality is better), or time (earlier is better). Besides these
special cases in which incentives correspond to a separate dimension of alternatives,
the general setup applies if A is, e.g., a commodity space (≥∗ being the natural
vector order on Rn) or a space of lotteries or acts whose outcomes are commodity
bundles (≥∗ being the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance relation).
Given a binary relation < on a poset A , deﬁne the binary relation <∗ on A by,






i.e., a <∗ a′ if and only if any alternative dominating a is strictly preferred to a′,
and say that < is:
– weakly upper monotonic if, for all a ∈ A , a <∗ a,
– strongly upper monotonic if, for all a,a′ ∈ A , a < a′ ⇒ a <∗ a′.
As for nonsatiation, weak upper monotonicity is the usual requirement that dom-
inating alternatives are strictly preferred, and strong upper monotonicity (which
implies the weak version provided that < is reﬂexive) follows from it if < is tran-
sitive but must be independently stated otherwise. It is intuitively straightforward
that monotonicity implies nonsatiation: by unboundedness of A , any alternative
a ∈ A is dominated by some a′ and by denseness of A this a′ can be taken arbitrar-
ily close to a, so no a cannot be a local maximum if < is monotonic. To establishE. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 12
this statement (and others) formally, we endow A with the partial order topology
(i.e., the topology generated by the subbasis
S
a∈A{A(>∗,a),A(a,>∗)}, which is
well-deﬁned by unboundedness of A ). We then obtain:
Lemma 2. Let < be a complete and strongly upper monotonic binary relation on
an unbounded and dense poset A . Then:
a. < is strongly upper nonsatiated,
b. < is upper semi-continuous if and only if, for all a,a′ ∈ A , a <∗ a′ ⇒ a < a′,
c. < is upper archimedean if and only if, for all a,a′,ˆ a ∈ A such that [ˆ a >∗ a and
a ≻ a′], there exists ˆ a′ ∈ A such that [ˆ a ≻ ˆ a′ and ˆ a′ >∗ a′].
Proof. a. Let a,a′ ∈ A such that a < a′ and let V be a neighborhood of a. By
unboundedness of A , there exists ˜ a ∈ A dominating a such that V contains all
ˆ a ∈ A such that [˜ a >∗ ˆ a and ˆ a >∗ a]. By denseness of A , there exists such a ˆ a. By
strong upper monotonicity of <, ˆ a ≻ a′ and, hence, a ∈ cl(A(≻,a′)).
b. Assume that < is upper semi-continuous, let a,a′ ∈ A such that a <∗ a′, and
let V be a neighborhood of a. By the preceding argument, there exists ˆ a ∈ V such
that ˆ a >∗ a and, hence, ˆ a ≻ a′, so a < a′. Conversely, assume that, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,
a <∗ a′ ⇒ a < a′, and let a,a′ ∈ A such that a ∈ cl(A(<,a′)). For all ˆ a ∈ A such
that ˆ a >∗ a, A(ˆ a,>∗) is a neighborhood of a and, hence, there exists ˜ a ∈ A(ˆ a,>∗)
such that ˜ a < a′. By strong upper monotonicity of <, this implies ˆ a ≻ a′. Hence
a <∗ a′ and, hence a < a′.
c. Assume that < is upper archimedean, and let a,a′,ˆ a ∈ A such that [ˆ a >∗ a
and a ≻ a′]. Then A(ˆ a,>∗) is a neighborhood of a and, hence, there exist ˜ a ∈
A(ˆ a,>∗) and a neighborhood V ′ of a′ such that ˜ a ≻ ˜ a′ for all ˜ a′ ∈ V ′. Hence ˆ a ≻ ˜ a′
for all ˜ a′ ∈ V ′ by strong upper monotonicity of < and, in particular, ˆ a ≻ ˆ a′ for
some ˆ a′ ∈ V ′ such that ˆ a′ >∗ a′. Conversely, assume that, for all a,a′,ˆ a ∈ A such
that [ˆ a >∗ a and a ≻ a′], there exists ˆ a′ ∈ A such that [ˆ a ≻ ˆ a′ and ˆ a′ >∗ a′]. Let
a,a′ ∈ A such that a ≻ a′ and let V be a neighborhood of a. Then there exists
ˆ a ∈ V such that ˆ a >∗ a and, hence, there exists ˆ a′ ∈ A such that [ˆ a ≻ ˆ a′ and
ˆ a′ >∗ a′]. It follows that A(ˆ a′,>∗) is a neighborhood of a′. Now, suppose there
exists ˜ a′ ∈ A(ˆ a′,>∗) such that not ˆ a ≻ ˜ a′. Then ˜ a′ < ˆ a by completeness of < and,
hence, ˆ a′ ≻ ˆ a by strong upper monotonicity of <, a contradiction.
Note that the weak version of part a also holds: if < is weakly upper monotonic,
then it is weakly upper nonsatiated. Parts b and c give restatements of the precedingE. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 13
section’s topological properties given the order structure assumed in the present
section. In particular, archimedeanness now more transparently reﬂects the property
that small changes in alternatives have a small eﬀect on preference: if a ≻ a′ and
some (however small) bonus is adjoined to a (yielding the alternative ˆ a), then it
must be possible to adjoin some (small enough) bonus to a′ (yielding the alternative
ˆ a′) so as to preserve the relation ˆ a ≻ ˆ a′. We obtain analogs of Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 in this setup:
Theorem 3. Let <B and <C be two complete binary relations on an unbounded and
dense poset A such that <B is compatible with <C. If <C is upper semi-continuous
and strongly upper monotonic, then <C = <∗
B.
Proof. Let a,a′ ∈ A . If a <C a′, then a <∗
C a′ by strong upper monotonicity of
<C and, hence, a <∗
B a′ by compatibility. Conversely, if a <∗
B a′, then ˆ a <C a′ for
all ˆ a ∈ A such that ˆ a >∗ a by completeness of <C and compatibility. Now, for all
ˆ a ∈ A such that ˆ a >∗ a, there exists ˜ a ∈ A such that ˆ a >∗ ˜ a >∗ a by denseness of
A and, hence, ˆ a ≻C a′ by strong upper monotonicity of <C. Hence a <∗
C a′ and,
hence, a <C a′ by upper semi-continuity of <C.
Theorem 4. Let <B be a complete binary relation on an unbounded and dense
poset A . Then <B is upper archimedean and strongly upper monotonic if and only
if there exists a complete, upper semi-continuous and strongly upper monotonic
binary relation <C on A such that <B is compatible with <C. Moreover, <C is
unique.
Proof. Assume that <B is upper archimedean and strongly upper monotonic. By
Theorem 2, it is suﬃcient to show that the binary relation <C on A deﬁned by
Equation 1 is strongly upper monotonic. Let a,a′,ˆ a ∈ A such that a <C a′ and
ˆ a >∗ a. Then A(ˆ a,>∗) is a neighborhood of a and, hence, there exists ¯ a ∈ A(ˆ a,>∗
) such that ¯ a <B a′. By denseness of A , there exists ˜ a ∈ A(ˆ a,>∗) such that
˜ a >∗ ¯ a and, hence ˜ a ≻B a′ by strong upper monotonicity of <B. Hence, by upper
archimedeanness of <B, there exist ˇ a ∈ A(ˆ a,>∗) and a neighborhood V ′ of a′ such
that ˇ a ≻B ˆ a′ for all ˆ a′ ∈ V ′. By strong upper monotonicity of <B, it follows that
ˆ a ≻B ˆ a′ for all ˆ a′ ∈ V ′. Hence not a′ <C a, i.e., a ≻C a′ by completeness of <C.
Conversely, assume that there exists a complete, upper semi-continuous and
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<C. By Theorem 2, it is suﬃcient to show that <B is strongly upper monotonic.
Let a,a′ ∈ A such that a <B a′. Then a <C a′ by completeness of <C and
compatibility and, hence a <∗
C a′ by strong upper monotonicity of <C. Hence
a <∗
B a′ by compatibility.
As in the general case, lower versions of weak and strong monotonicity can
be deﬁned and the corresponding results follow. Moreover, the upper and lower
results can be combined, but note that strong upper monotonicity and strong lower
monotonicity are equivalent for a complete binary relation (and similarly for weak
monotonicity).
5 Pseudo-utility
It is well-known (Cantor, 1895) that a complete binary relation < on a set A is
representable by a utility function (i.e., there exists a function u : A → R such that,
for all a,a′ ∈ A ,u(a) ≥ u(a′) ⇔ a < a′) if and only if it is transitive and separable
(i.e., there exists a countable subset A of A such that, for all a,a′ ∈ A such that
a ≻ a′, there exists ˆ a ∈ A such that a < ˆ a < a′). Now, in the present setup, starting
from a complete binary relation <B on a topological space A , we derive a complete
binary relation <C and, if <C is transitive and separable, it can be represented
by a utility function u, even though <B might be neither transitive nor separable.
Furthermore, because <C is continuous, we know that u can be taken continuous
provided that A satisﬁes certain topological properties (Eilenberg, 1941; Debreu,
1954; Rader, 1963), even though <B might be discontinuous. Thus, the present
analysis can yield generalizations of classical results on representation of presences
by continuous utility functions.
Because <B is compatible with <C but might not be equal to <C, a utility
function u representing <C does not in general represent <B in the classical sense,
but in the following, weaker sense (Moulin, 1988; Subiza and Peris, 1998):
Deﬁnition. A function u : A → R is a pseudo-utility representation of a binary
relation <B on a set A if, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,u(a) > u(a′) ⇒ a ≻B a′.
A pseudo-utility representation u is not a full utility representation because it
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that u(a) = u(a′) (i.e., in the present framework, on indiﬀerent selection). For this
reason, a constant u is a pseudo-utility representation of any binary relation and,
therefore, additional restrictions must be imposed for the representation to be of
interest. Subiza and Peris (1998) assume that A is a topological space (endowed
with some ﬁnite measure) and require u to be continuous and nontrivial (i.e., if
[a ≻B ˆ a and ˆ a ≻B a′] for all ˆ a in some open subset of A , then u(a) > u(a′)). In the
present setup, by nonsatiation of <C, a stronger requirement than nontriviality can
be imposed: say that u is locally unbounded above if, for all open subset V of A ,
argmaxa∈V u(a) = ∅.
Lemma 3. Let <B be a binary relation on a topological space A and u be a pseudo-
utility representation of <B. If u is locally unbounded above, then it is nontrivial.
Proof. Assume that u is locally unbounded above, and let a,a′ ∈ A such that
[a ≻B ˆ a and ˆ a ≻B a′] for all ˆ a in some open subset V of A . Then u(a) ≥ u(ˆ a) and
u(ˆ a) ≥ u(a′) because u is a pseudo-utility representation of <B. Moreover, by local
unboundedness of u, it is not possible that u(a) = u(ˆ a) for all ˆ a ∈ V . Hence there
must exist ˆ a ∈ V such that u(a) > u(ˆ a) and, hence, u(a) > u(a′), so a ≻B a′.
In order to establish pseudo-utility representation results, we need to characterize
those behavioral preference relations <B on A for which the cognitive preference
relation <C on A deﬁned by Equation 1 is transitive. Say that a binary relation
< on a topological space A is upper closure-transitive if, for all a,a′,a′′ ∈ A ,
[a ∈ cl(A(<,a′)) and a′ ∈ cl(A(<,a′′))] ⇒ a ∈ cl(A(<,a′′)). In the present setup,
upper closure-transitivity is weaker than transitivity, but still yields equivalence
between weak and strong nonsatiation:
Lemma 4. Let < be a complete, upper archimedean, and weakly upper nonsatiated
binary relation on a topological space A . Then:
a. if < is transitive, then it is upper closure-transitive,
b. if < is upper closure-transitive, then it is strongly upper nonsatiated.
Proof. a. Assume that < is transitive, let a,a′,a′′ ∈ A such that [a ∈ cl(A(<,a′))
and a′ ∈ cl(A(<,a′′))], and let V be a neighborhood of a. Then there exists ˆ a ∈ V
such that ˆ a < a′. By weak upper nonsatiation of <, there exists ˜ a ∈ V such that
˜ a ≻ ˆ a and, hence, ˜ a ≻ a′ by transitivity of <. Hence, by upper archimedeanness ofE. Danan – Revealed preference and indiﬀerent selection 16
<, there exist ¯ a ∈ V and a neighborhood V ′ of a′ such that ¯ a ≻ ˆ a′ for all ˆ a′ ∈ V ′.
Moreover, there exists ˜ a′ ∈ V ′ such that ˜ a′ < a′′ and, hence, ¯ a ≻ ˆ a′′ by transitivity
of <, so a ∈ cl(A(<,a′′)).
b. Assume that < is upper closure-transitive, let a,a′ ∈ A such that a < a′, and
let V be a neighborhood of a. Then, by weak upper nonsatiation of <, there exists
ˆ a ∈ V such that ˆ a ≻ a. Hence, by upper archimedeanness of <, there exist ˜ a ∈ V
and a neighborhood ¯ V of a such that ˜ a ≻ ¯ a for all ¯ a ∈ ¯ V . Now, suppose there does
not exist ˇ a ∈ V such that ˇ a ≻ a′. Then a′ < ˇ a for all ˇ a ∈ V by completeness of
< and, hence, a ∈ cl(A(<,ˇ a)) for all ˇ a ∈ V by upper closure-transitivity of <, a
contradiction. Hence there exists ˇ a ∈ V such ˇ a ≻ a′, so a ∈ cl(A(≻,a′)).
Note that the converse of part a does not hold: upper closure-transitivity is
strictly weaker than transitivity. For example, consider the commodity space A =
R2 of Section 2 and the behavioral preference relation <B on A deﬁned therein,
and amend <B by assuming (2,0) ≻B (1,1) ≻B (0,2) ≻B (2,0). Then <B is
not transitive, but it is upper closure-transitive (upper closure-transitivity of <B is
equivalent to transitivity of the third cognitive relation <C deﬁned in the example,
independently of the latter amendment of <B).
We obtain a generalization of Rader (1963)’s representation result on a second-
countable topological space:
Theorem 5. Let <B be a complete binary relation on a second-countable topolog-
ical space A . Then <B is upper archimedean, weakly upper nonsatiated and upper
closure-transitive if and only if there exists an upper semi-continuous and locally
unbounded above pseudo-utility representation u of <B. Moreover, u is unique up
to a strictly increasing transformation f : u(A ) → R such that f ◦ u is upper
semi-continuous.
Proof. Assume that <B is upper archimedean, weakly upper nonsatiated and upper
closure-transitive. Then, by Theorem 2 and Lemma 4, there exists a complete, upper
semi-continuous and weakly upper nonsatiated binary relation <C on A such that
<B is compatible with <C. Moreover, <C is transitive by Theorem 1 and Lemma 4.
Because A is second-countable, it follows from Rader (1963)’s result that there
exists an upper semi-continuous utility representation u of <C. Moreover, u is locally
unbounded above by weak upper nonsatiation of <C. Finally, u is a pseudo-utility
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Conversely, assume that there exists an upper semi-continuous and locally un-
bounded above pseudo-utility representation u of <B. Deﬁne the binary relation
<C on A by, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,a <C a′ ⇔ u(a) ≥ u(a′). Then u is a utility repre-
sentation of <C and, hence, <C is complete, transitive, and upper semi-continuous.
Moreover, <C is weakly upper nonsatiated because u is locally unbounded above,
and <B is compatible with <C because u is a pseudo-utility representation of <B.
Hence <B is upper archimedean and weakly upper nonsatiated by Theorem 2 and
Lemma 4. Moreover, <B is upper closure-transitive by Theorem 1 and Lemma 4.
For the uniqueness part, let u be an upper semi-continuous and locally un-
bounded above pseudo-utility representation of <B and let f : u(A ) → R. Clearly,
if f is strictly increasing then f ◦u is also a locally unbounded above pseudo-utility
representation of <B. Conversely, if f◦u is a locally unbounded above pseudo-utility
representation of <B then, for all a,a′ ∈ A ,u(a) > u(a′) ⇒ a ≻ a′ ⇒ f ◦ u(a) ≥
f ◦ u(a′). Moreover, suppose there exist a,a′ ∈ A such that [u(a) > u(a′) and
f ◦ u(a) = f ◦ u(a′)]. Then V = {ˆ a ∈ A : u(a) > u(ˆ a)} is an open subset of A
by upper semi-continuity of u and a′ ∈ argmaxˆ a∈V f ◦u(ˆ a), a contradiction because
f ◦ u is locally unbounded above. Hence f is strictly increasing.
In order to get a lower version of this result, say that a binary relation < on a
topological space A is lower closure-transitive if, for all a,a′,a′′ ∈ A , [a′ ∈ cl(A(a,<
)) and a′′ ∈ cl(A(a′,<))] ⇒ a′′ ∈ cl(A(a,<)), and say that a function u : A → R
is locally unbounded below if, for all open subset V of A , argmina∈V u(a) = ∅. The
analog of Theorem 5 then holds. Moreover, the two results can be combined, yielding
a generalization of Debreu (1954)’s representation result. Say that < is closure-
transitive if it is both upper closure transitive and lower closure-transitive, and that
u is locally unbounded if it is locally unbounded above and locally unbounded below.
Theorem 6. Let <B be a complete binary relation on a second-countable topolog-
ical space A . Then <B is archimedean, weakly nonsatiated and closure-transitive
if and only if there exists a continuous and locally unbounded pseudo-utility repre-
sentation u of <B. Moreover, u is unique up to a strictly increasing transformation
f : u(A ) → R such that f ◦ u is continuous.
We conclude with a generalization of Eilenberg (1941)’s representation result on
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Theorem 7. Let <B be a complete binary relation on a ﬁrst-countable and con-
nected topological space A . Then <B is archimedean, weakly nonsatiated and
closure-transitive if and only if there exists a continuous and locally unbounded
pseudo-utility representation u of <B. Moreover, u is unique up to a strictly in-
creasing and continuous transformation.
The proofs of Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 are similar to that of Theorem 5 and,
therefore, omitted. Note that in Theorem 7, connectedness of A yields a stronger
uniqueness result (Wakker, 1991).
Conclusion
This paper shows that preferences can be derived from choice behavior in a way
that is robust to indiﬀerent selection. More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954)
to reveal indiﬀerent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alter-
natives is formalized in a general topological setup, and is found to essentially rely
on an assumption of continuity of preferences.
Although Savage (1954)’s argument is well known, it is seldom used to elicit in-
diﬀerence in practice. Rather, the experimental literature generally resorts to such
devices as randomization or delegation. A possible defense of this standard practice
is that the monetary perturbation method, although more satisfactory in theory, is
impossible to implement because there is no such thing as an inﬁnitely small mon-
etary bonus in practice. Nevertheless, using some small bonus as an approximation
could still represent an improvement over the usual elicitation methods. For ex-
ample, if an experimental study provides evidence of some strict preference pattern
violating a standard axiom, then such evidence could be strengthened by checking
for robustness of the pattern to the adjunction of this small bonus.
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